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ABSTRACT 
 
 We use a panel of hospitals from Washington state to examine the impact of 
government reimbursement on a provider’s costs.  We find that providers change their 
relative patient mix when Medicare and Medicaid lower reimbursement rates.  On a 
percentage change basis, the magnitudes of these changes are small; however, the 
overall economic impacts are quite large.  Additionally, our findings indicate that a 
number of other factors significantly influence a provider’s costs, including patient 
demographics, initial illness severity and input market conditions facing the firm. 
 
We thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.  We also 
thank William Greene for valuable econometric advice when making revisions to this 
manuscript.  Remaining errors are our own. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Beginning in the early 1980’s, government health insurance programs 
attempted to control rapidly increasing costs by implementing fee controls on health 
care providers.  These fee controls have taken a number of forms, including 
prospective payment, RBRVS and capitation reimbursement.  As a result, providers 
lost the ability to set prices for government insured patients, although they retained 
this ability for other patients.  Moreover, as government insurers cut their 
reimbursement over the next ten years, providers became increasingly constrained 
(Dranove and White 1998). 
  
A common impression is that, as providers became more constrained, they 
responded by either raising prices to non-government insured patients or lowering 
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service intensity to some or all patients.  The former response has come to be called 
“cost shifting,” while the latter has been termed “cost adjusting.”  See Dranove (1988) 
or Rosenman, Li and Friesner (2000) for an overview of cost shifting.  Dor and Farley 
(1996) and Friesner (2002) provide a review of the cost adjusting literature.  Note that 
the distinguishing feature of cost shifting and cost adjusting (as opposed to price and 
service intensity discrimination) is that providers are motivated by the revenue 
constraint, not the opportunity to increase profit and prestige.  
  
Most analyses of cost shifting, and cost adjusting have concentrated on 
investigating how a provider’s profit status affects its behavior.  Hay (1983) 
concluded that declines in government reimbursement induce cost shifting only if a 
profit-maximizing provider incurs diseconomies of scale in production.  Rosenman, Li 
and Friesner (2000) found that a nonprofit provider cost shifts only when declines in 
government reimbursement cut revenues proportionately more than costs.  Rosenman 
and Friesner (2002) found a similar condition for nonprofit service intensity 
adjustment, while a for-profit firm’s cost adjusting behavior depends on the presence 
of economies of scale and economies of scope. 
  
With a fixed patient mix, the revenue implications of cost shifting, and cost 
adjusting are quite clear.  Lower government reimbursement translates into lower total 
revenue for the firm.  However, whether or not the patient mix is static, the effects of 
lower government reimbursement on the total costs of a provider are not so clear.  
While most experts would agree that the firm has an incentive to lower its total costs, 
the exact mechanism underlying this incentive is ambiguous.  For example, lower 
government reimbursement may force the firm to change its relative input mix.  
Alternatively, the firm may respond by changing the patients it treats.  One possibility 
is to treat fewer patients, thereby moving down its marginal cost curve(s).  Another 
response, if the firm considers different patient groups as separate outputs, is to 
change its relative patient mix, rather than its choice of inputs. There is a substantial 
empirical literature supporting the assertion that health care producers treat different 
patient groups as different outputs.  Two examples are Friesner (2002) and Dor and 
Farley (1996).  Understanding this mechanism has important implications for health 
policy.  Changing relative input mix will likely lower quality, especially if the firm 
was already cost efficient.  However, if the firm is cutting costs by changing its 
relative patient mix, the quality effect is not clear, and there is the possibility of a 
welfare transfer across different patient groups, something that has not yet addressed 
in the literature.  
  
An additional concern is the magnitude of this incentive.  If decreases in 
government reimbursement have little or no effect on total costs, then it is likely that 
the firm will cost shift or cost adjust.  However, if government reimbursement has a 
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substantial effect on costs, then cost shifting and cost adjusting are less likely, because 
the firm may be able to offset the revenue (and profit) reduction through cost savings.      
 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the effects of government 
reimbursement on a provider’s (total) cost structure.  To do so, we estimate an 
industry cost function for hospitals in Washington state.  We can then test the effects 
of government reimbursement changes on the industry cost function using a two step 
process.  First, we test whether any government insurer’s reimbursement has an 
overall effect on costs: 
 
HO:  Government reimbursement has no effect on total cost.  
HA: Government reimbursement has an effect on total cost 
 
This is equivalent to placing a set of joint linear restrictions on the efficiency 
parameters of the model.  If a government insurer’s reimbursement does have a 
statistically significant (overall) effect on the cost function, we move to the second 
step.  At least one of the efficiency parameters should be statistically different than 
zero.  Thus, if we reject the null hypothesis, it becomes interesting to explore the signs 
and magnitudes of these incentives.  Such an examination is easily accomplished by 
looking at the elasticity of cost with respect to each government insurer’s 
reimbursement proportion (or discount to charges).  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds in four parts.  First, we present the 
econometric methodology that we use to explore not only how a provider attempts to 
lower its total cost in response to decreases in government reimbursement, but also to 
determine the magnitudes of these incentives via cost elasticities.  Then we discuss 
our data, which consists of a panel of general, non-specialty hospitals from 
Washington state.  Third, we present and discuss the results of our empirical analysis.  
We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of our findings for policy and 
also present some suggestions for future research.     
 
II. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
 Consider an industry (total) cost function with the following form: 
 
Cit = f (Y1,it,,..., YN,it, W1,it, ..., WM,it, Q1,it, ..., QL,it)       
(1) 
 
where Cit is total cost, i indexes each firm, t represents time, Y1, it, ..., YN, it, are the 
firm’s outputs, W1, it, ..., WM, it are the firm’s (real) input prices and Q1, it, ..., QL, it are 
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exogenous factors that affect the efficiency of the firm.  Under the hypothesis that 
providers change cost structures in response to decreases in government 
reimbursement, the Q’s can be interpreted as the proportion of charges reimbursed by 
the government insurer.  Since different government insurers have different 
reimbursement methods, we would like to have one Q for each government insurance 
plan.  Additionally, we use the proportion of hospital charges reimbursed by the 
government insurer as a measure of Q because, while firms can set charges for all 
patient groups, the government insurer’s actual reimbursement is independent of these 
charges.  Finally, we restrict our analysis to government reimbursement (as opposed 
to private insurers’ reimbursement) for two reasons.  Unlike government insurers, 
private third-party payers usually must contract with the provider to obtain discounts 
to charges.  Consequently, a provider may exert a substantial amount of control over 
the average reimbursement received for treating privately insured patients.  Changes 
in reimbursement may not specifically be intended to force the provider to become 
more cost efficient.  Additionally, while it is true that some non-government third 
party payers are attempting to implement reimbursement systems that mimic those of 
Medicare or Medicaid, the data do not allow us to distinguish between these private 
insurers and those that reimburse on a traditional discounts-to-charges basis.  Since 
adding the private discounts to charges to our analysis would force us to make this 
distinction, we chose to abstract from this issue for simplicity.         
 
Taking the log of (1), performing a second order Taylor series expansion and 
creating additive error terms, we derive a generalized version of the translog flexible 
functional form: 
 
 
   
(2) 
 
where Xj; j = 1, ..., J are a number of exogenous shifters, hi is a firm specific effect, nt 
is a time specific effect and uit is an error term with mean zero and constant variance. 
The Taylor expansion is taken around the points ln(Yn,it) = 0, ln(Wm,it) = 0 and ln(Ql,it) 
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= 0, for n = 1, ..., N;  m = 1, ..., M and l = 1, ..., L.  Specifying the firm specific effect 
is consistent with the notion that quality (which is unobservable and firm specific) has 
a substantial impact on a firm’s total costs.  Similarly, the time specific effect captures 
the mean level of technological progress (or regress). Given the nature of the data set 
we use, the time specific effect may also embody fluctuations in market conditions 
over the entire sample period.  Cross symmetry implies that ahi = aih, bgf = bfg and grs 
= gsr. 
As noted in Christensen and Greene (1976), in order to correspond to a well-
behaved production function, a cost function must be homogeneous of degree one in 
prices.  This implies applying the following restrictions: 
 
              
(3) 
           
(4) 
         
(5) 
 
 We test the significance of imposing these restrictions and we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that the restricted and unrestricted model parameter estimates are 
equal.  In fact, 
these restrictions are jointly insignificant at better than a 5 percent level of 
significance (F-test statistic 0.0001).  Failing to reject this null hypothesis means that 
there is no reason to artificially impose their restrictions.  Doing so is statistically 
irrelevant.  Therefore, we present the unrestricted model.  
 
We can test the effects of government reimbursement changes on the industry 
cost function using a two-step process.  First, we must test whether any government 
insurer’s reimbursement has an overall effect on costs.  This can be accomplished via 
the following hypothesis test: 
 
HO: g1 = g2 = ... = gL = g11 = g12 =... = gLL = l11 = l12 = ... = lNL = p11 = p12 = ... = pML 
= 0  
HA: At least one of these parameters does not equal zero. 
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That is, the null hypothesis that the government reimbursement plan has no effect on 
total cost is equivalent to placing a set of joint linear restrictions on the efficiency 
parameters of the model.  If a government insurer’s reimbursement does have a 
statistically significant (overall) effect on the cost function, at least one of those 
parameters should be statistically different than zero. 
  
If we reject the null hypothesis, then it becomes interesting to explore the signs 
and magnitudes of these incentives.  Such an examination is easily accomplished by 
looking at the elasticity of cost with respect to each government insurer’s discount to 
charges: 
 
 
 (6) 
  for every r ¹ s. 
 
However, because this is an aggregate compilation of estimated parameters (and data), 
it does not provide information concerning the effects of government reimbursement 
on specific inputs and outputs of the firm.  Fortunately, the signs and magnitudes of 
these individual relationships can be calculated via second order effects on cost. 
 
  for n = 1, ..., N and l = 1, ..., L   
(7) 
 for m = 1, ..., M and l = 1, ..., L   
(8) 
 
A positive (negative) value for (7) indicates that decreasing the government 
reimbursement (i.e., increasing the discount) makes the firm more (less) cost 
responsive to changes in output Yn,it.  It is possible to interpret these impacts as 
changes in the slope of the marginal cost curve at any particular output.  A positive 
(negative) value for (8) implies that decreases in the government reimbursement make 
the firm more (less) cost responsive to changes in input price Wm,it.  This supplies 
some information about how changes in reimbursement affect how the cost curve 
shifts as input prices change. 
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 As an alternative to equation (2), we employ a specification of the cost function 
that normalizes values around the sample mean.  In estimating equation (2), the 
parameter estimates that contribute to the elasticities of cost in (3) may be 
insignificant.  For example, if the estimate for gll is not statistically different than zero, 
it is not clear whether the actual parameter value should be included in the elasticity 
calculation or whether a value of zero should be included in its place.  In addition, 
since these elasticities are calculated as a linear combination of parameter estimates, 
they lack estimated standard errors, making it difficult, but not impossible, to 
determine their statistical significance.  Normally, one can test for the joint 
significance of coefficient estimates by using an F-test.  However, given the relatively 
large number of cost function parameters, this would require a large number of F-tests 
to be conducted, and much of this work is not automatically generated by standard 
statistical packages.  Our approach provides results that are equivalent to those given 
by the F-test but does so in a way that allows standard statistical packages to 
automatically generate the results.  We avoid these issues by re-specifying equation 
(2) as follows: 
 
 
            
 (9) 
 
The advantage of (9) is that: 
     for l = 1, ..., L      
(10) 
     for n = 1, ..., N and l = 1, ..., L   
(11) 
    for m = 1, ..., M and l = 1, ..., L   
(12) 
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As long as both (2) and (9) are evaluated at the sample mean, they will provide 
equivalent values.  Note that since we are evaluating our elasticities and second order 
effects at the sample mean, this analysis is examining the effects of government 
reimbursement on the costs of the “average” health care provider, rather than for the 
individual hospitals in our data.  
 
A final issue of interest concerns the treatment of the group specific and time 
specific effects.  If the regressors in equation (9) include all important causal effects 
of total cost, then the group and time specific effects should have a zero mean and be 
uncorrelated with the regressors.  In this case, it is appropriate to use a random 
effects/FGLS model, which treats the individual effects as such.  However, if equation 
(9) omits important time or firm specific effects (such as quality, time-based market 
fluctuations and time based technological change), then these individual effects will 
carry a nonzero mean and will be correlated with the regressors.  In this case, the 
results produced by FGLS will be inconsistent, and so it is appropriate to use a fixed 
effect/LSDV estimator, which provides consistent estimates in the presence of such 
correlation. Dranove and Cone (1985) have also shown that correlation between the 
time-specific error terms and the regressors (in our case, the government 
reimbursement variables) may be indicative of regression to the mean in costs.  Thus, 
if the LSDV estimator is the more appropriate model, regression to the mean may be 
present in our sample.  However, specifying the LSDV estimator should reduce these 
effects of this bias in our results.   Because we believe that quality and time-based 
effects are important determinants of total cost, we specify the LSDV estimator and 
use the Hausman test (1978) to confirm our choice.  This test operates under the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the error terms and the regressors (i.e., both the 
LSDV and the FGLS estimators provide consistent estimates, but FGLS is efficient).  
Under the alternative hypothesis, the LSDV estimator provides consistent estimates, 
whereas FGLS does not.  The test is based on the following statistic: 
 
T = (bLSDV - bFGLS)’(WLSDV - WFGLS)
-1(bLSDV - bFGLS )      
(13) 
 
where bLSDV and bFGLS are Kx1 vectors of parameter estimates produced by the LSDV 
and FGLS estimators, respectively, and WLSDV and WFGLS are the estimated covariance 
matrices for each estimator.  Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic is distributed 
as chi-square with K degrees of freedom.   
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III. DATA 
 
The data used in this study consist of hospitals in Washington state.  Each 
hospital submits and certifies a quarterly report of financial and utilization data to the 
Washington State Department of Health.  All of the data used in this analysis comes 
from these reports for the years 1998 through 2001.  There were 87 non-specialty 
hospitals in the complete sample; however, missing data left 81hospitals available for 
use in the analysis.  Missing data resulted primarily from a hospital not treating 
patients within a particular group, indicating that excluded hospitals were smaller, 
rural hospitals. Out of these 81 hospitals, 4 are for-profit- while the remaining 77 are 
classified as nonprofit.  Two for-profit providers are present in every quarter.  The 
remaining two firms are present in 13 of the 16 quarters.  Our rationale for including 
both for-profit and nonprofit firms in the same sample is twofold.  First, our goal is to 
look at mean impact of government reimbursement on costs within the industry, 
which naturally includes both types of firms.  Moreover, our results should be 
consistent even if we include both types of firms, since any significant mean 
differences in behavior between for-profit and nonprofit firms will be captured by the 
firm and time-specific effects. 
 
 Outputs were measured as total outpatient visits and total patient days.  In 
Washington state, there are two primary government insurers: Medicare and 
Medicaid, each with its own reimbursement system.  Consequently, we divided total 
patient days into three categories, Medicare and Medicaid patient days, and a group 
denoted as “other” which included all remaining patient days.   Although it would be 
advantageous to categorize total outpatient visits in a similar manner; data limitations 
made doing so impossible.  Thus, all outpatient days are treated as a single group. Our 
data set allowed us to construct a number of input prices.  The price of labor was 
calculated as payroll and benefit expenses per paid hour.  The price of capital was 
measured as the sum of interest and depreciation expenses per square foot of each 
facility.  Finally, the price of supplies was measured as the sum of purchased supplies 
per licensed bed.  The method we use to calculate our input prices is commonly 
employed in the health services research literature (for example, see Vita (1990) and 
Gertler (1988)).  One drawback to using hospital-wide input prices is that they may be 
too aggregated, and thus may not give an entirely clear indication about how changes 
in government reimbursement cause aprovider to change its relative input mix within 
different cost centers of each hospital.  However, since our goal is to determine if 
those changes within the hospital exist, and if we find those changes to be significant 
using aggregated, hospital-wide data, it will most certainly be the case for specific 
cost centers within the hospital.  As a result, this drawback should not significantly 
impact our analysis, although it does present an area for future research.  All prices 
were deflated using the producer price index to real, 1982 dollars. 
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Government reimbursement for each patient group was measured as the 
proportion of total charges reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid.  We measure 
government reimbursement as a proportion to reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity. 
The Washington State Department of Health provides a casemix index (on a yearly 
basis) for each firm as a measure of inpatient illness severity.  These data are 
disaggregated by payer:  Medicare, Medicaid, and total for all inpatients.  In our 
analysis, we include the ratio of each of the government casemix indices to the overall 
hospital casemix.  We use these variables as ratios to underscore the fact that 
Medicare and Medicaid patients are believed to be relatively more (or less) sick, and 
thus utilize relatively more (or less) resources, than the average hospital inpatient 
admission.  
  
We also created three Herfindahl-like indices to control for the distribution of 
inpatient services across each type of hospital, as measured by the number of inpatient 
days for each patient group.  In general, the data report four types of inpatient services 
that a hospital can provide: acute care, skilled nursing services, swing beds, and other 
inpatient services (including rehabilitation, chemical dependency, and psych wards).  
Thus, an index value close to 0.25 indicates a relatively even mix of patient days (per 
group) across each of the four services.  On the other hand, a value close to one 
implies that the hospital allocates most of its inpatient days for that group (and, by 
proxy, most of its resources) to a particular type of service (usually acute care).       
 
Finally, we add a number of demographic variables (on a per county and year 
basis) to account for potential differences in market structure across hospitals.  These 
include variables relating to age (the number of minors and elderly), race (white, 
black, Native American, Asian, and Hispanic), and income level (average wage per 
job, converted to real, 1982 dollars using the consumer price index).    
 
Table 1 contains the definitions and descriptive statistics for each of the 
variables used in this analysis.  The average number of licensed beds is approximately 
164, while the mean hospital casemix index is 0.88.  On average, hospitals treated 
about 27,500 
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patients on an outpatient basis.  Of particular interest is the distribution of inpatient 
services across each of our three patient groups.  Medicare and non-government-
insured patients each account for approximately 40 percent of total patient days, while 
Medicaid patients account for only about 20 percent.  Our casemix statistics also 
indicate that, on average, Medicare and non-government insured patients are more ill 
than Medicaid patients.  Moreover, Medicaid reimburses providers, on average, a 
lower proportion of billed charges than does Medicare (0.55 versus 0.61, 
respectively).  The implication of this finding is that hospitals may be more 
constrained by treating Medicare patients than Medicaid patients.  However, it 
remains to be seen whether this implication is borne out in the empirical analysis 
when we control for all other specified determinants of a provider’s costs.    
   
Table 2 breaks down the descriptive statistics by hospital size (as designated by 
Washington State Department of Health Peer Groups) into small firms, mid-sized 
  Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - All Firms   
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1stQuartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 27472.99 39183.42 445 6067.25 13677.5 35213.25 274592 
Medicare patient days 2908.16 3298.91 2 423 1220 4900 17330 
Medicaid patient days 1565.32 2030.39 3 232.25 869 2175.25 14173 
Other patient days 2823.76 3707.68 4 429.5 1350.5 3777 24533 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicare 0.61 0.13 0.03 0.52 0.61 0.7 1 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicaid 0.55 0.18 0.01 0.44 0.54 0.67 1 
Real operating costs 28750206 40430450 395121.87 2837887.22 13296163 35035648.03 247907374 
Real price for supplies 12910.33 8901.42 133.47 5455.89 11651.9 17164.24 51513.29 
Real price of capital 5.37 2.58 0.08 3.59 4.95 6.46 15.82 
Real price of labor 20.21 3 9 18.28 20.59 22.04 29.23 
Overall casemix index 0.88 0.25 0.42 0.71 0.83 0.97 1.7 
Medicare casemix index 1.11 0.28 0.62 0.87 1.09 1.25 2.34 
Medicaid casemix index 0.66 0.23 0.33 0.51 0.6 0.77 1.59 
Ratio of Medicare casemix to total 
casemix 1.28 0.17 0.9 1.19 1.27 1.37 1.96 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix to total 
casemix 0.75 0.13 0.49 0.67 0.72 0.81 2.02 
Medicare Herfindahl-type index 0.76 0.21 0.34 0.58 0.76 1 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type index 0.85 0.18 0.41 0.71 0.96 1 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.83 0.18 0.34 0.68 0.86 1 1 
Minor population 112607.59 138661.78 573 12253 40222 167678 388384 
Elderly population 50957.59 65531.87 492 5645 14768 57060 182526 
Total population 471180.67 621965.81 2317 47475.25 137844 623984 1752492 
White population 397796.94 504032.19 2293 43796 131031 560500 1415805 
African-American population 25694.38 42126.86 0 260 1667 15647 117816 
Native American population 9154.14 10646.94 12 932 4179 14369 33912 
Asian population 47519.6 81999.18 11 798.5 3968 47546 244324 
Hispanic Population 28475.52 33344.46 37 2734 12162 39542 101980 
Real average wage per job 18004.56 4747.84 12114.64 14703.89 16078.64 20364.11 27616.39 
        
Number of Observations 1036       
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firms and large firms.  Small and mid-sized firms account for approximately 400 each 
of our observations, while large hospitals account for 233 of the observations.  
However, large firms account for over two-thirds of all outpatient visits, and 
approximately two-thirds of all patient days as well.  While the magnitude of this 
dominance is large, the fact that large firms dominate the amount of care given to 
patients in Washington state is not at all surprising.  More interesting comparisons 
occur when looking at elements other than overall workload. 
 
Small hospitals receive a larger portion of charges paid by Medicaid (0.65) than 
do mid-sized (0.58) and large (0.59) hospitals.  This is also true for the proportion of 
charges paid by Medicaid, although large hospitals (0.56) are closer to small hospitals 
(0.59) in this case, while mid-sized firms (0.50) lag further behind.  This is somewhat 
surprising since the casemixes, in all categories, for small hospitals are lower than 
mid-sized, which are lower than large hospitals.  It would seem that Medicare and 
Medicaid pay proportionately more for less sick than more sick patients. 
 
Price variables indicate that it is less costly for smaller hospitals to buy labor 
and capital than mid-sized and large firms.  The real price of labor is $18.19 for small 
hospitals, $21.02 for mid-sized, and $22.38 for large.  Capital price has a similar 
ordering ($3.99, $5.90, and $6.88).  These prices likely reflect the greater complexity 
of care provided (to the sicker patients, as indicated by the casemix index) in 
progressively larger hospitals.  Labor costs also reflect the higher real average wage 
per job in the catchments areas of the hospitals.  As would be expected, smaller 
hospitals deal with smaller total populations, and have a larger proportion of elderly in 
their service areas.  What is not necessarily expected is that the proportion of the 
population in the county that is minority does not differ greatly by hospital size, 
although the make-up of the minority population does.  
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  Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - By Firm Size   
Small Firms        
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1stQuartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 8071.81 8029.71 445 3316 5159 9868 61593 
Medicare patient days 661.82 793.85 46 269 426 679 4368 
Medicaid patient days 978.82 1297.29 3 93 255 1776 6069 
Other patient days 608.27 574.29 4 196 417 861 3785 
Proportion of charges paid 
by Medicare 0.65 0.12 0.12 0.57 0.65 0.73 1 
Proportion of charges paid 
by Medicaid 0.59 0.2 0.01 0.47 0.59 0.73 1 
Real operating costs 4372151.7 4188494.4 395121.87 2016411.81 2520441.1 4976543.07 21029966 
Real price for supplies 7170.75 5343.15 133.47 3323.1 5003.6 10282.85 32067.75 
Real price of capital 3.99 1.75 0.53 2.87 3.77 5.03 11.47 
Real price of labor 18.19 2.79 9 16.36 18.26 20.1 28.03 
Overall casemix index 0.73 0.12 0.45 0.65 0.71 0.79 1.1 
Medicare casemix index 0.89 0.13 0.62 0.8 0.85 0.99 1.14 
Medicaid casemix index 0.57 0.17 0.33 0.45 0.52 0.61 1.47 
Ratio of Medicare casemix 
to total casemix 1.24 0.18 0.96 1.1 1.21 1.36 1.7 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix 
to total casemix 0.78 0.15 0.51 0.68 0.74 0.84 2.02 
Medicare Herfindahl-type 
index 0.75 0.23 0.34 0.51 0.79 1 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type 
index 0.93 0.12 0.5 0.94 1 1 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.87 0.17 0.44 0.75 0.99 1 1 
Minor population 12208.48 10823.76 573 5151 10798 18034 70263 
Elderly population 6261.47 4519.95 492 2716 5174 8802 25118 
Total population 44513.16 34575.1 2317 19530 39566 66869 223253 
White population 42031.09 32513.62 2293 18572 34816 65300 206757 
African-American population 400.3 581.54 0 71 195 545 3462 
Native American population 1684.92 2128.9 12 577 860 1535 13100 
Asian population 806.25 961.72 11 225 494 982 4765 
Hispanic Population 6667.26 12634.98 37 733 1774 6762 82332 
Real average wage per job 14280.03 1155.35 12114.64 13261.25 14422.25 15083.9 16819.38 
Number of Observations 407       
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Mid-Sized Firms (Table 2: Continued)      
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1stQuartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 22507.76 17123.06 1105 10942.75 18003 28230.75 135041 
Medicare patient days 2755.05 2047.78 145 950.5 2607 4429.5 9389 
Medicaid patient days 980.15 760.43 56 378.25 822 1309.25 4463 
Other patient days 2269.51 1801.53 26 931 1946 3184.25 10577 
Proportion of charges paid 
by Medicare 0.58 0.12 0.03 0.5 0.58 0.66 0.94 
Proportion of charges paid 
by Medicaid 0.5 0.14 0.05 0.41 0.5 0.58 0.99 
Real operating costs 22507431 17781362 1033624.5 9461587.27 20484249 29126910.95 116416095 
Real price for supplies 12993.44 5637.93 1444.31 9519.8 12439.28 16247.32 29578.64 
Real price of capital 5.9 2.65 0.08 4.02 5.22 7.21 14.94 
Real price of labor 21.02 2.11 13.42 20.07 21.07 22.32 29.11 
Overall casemix index 0.85 0.14 0.42 0.76 0.87 0.95 1.08 
Medicare casemix index 1.12 0.15 0.73 1.02 1.14 1.21 1.43 
Medicaid casemix index 0.61 0.13 0.35 0.51 0.6 0.66 0.97 
Ratio of Medicare casemix 
to total casemx 1.34 0.15 1.03 1.26 1.31 1.39 1.96 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix 
to total casemix 0.72 0.12 0.49 0.65 0.69 0.8 1.04 
Medicare Herfindahl-type 
index 0.77 0.22 0.35 0.59 0.79 1 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type 
index 0.86 0.18 0.41 0.75 0.96 1 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.82 0.2 0.34 0.64 0.91 1 1 
Minor population 137132.26 133544.74 11516 26967 70063 183130 388384 
Elderly population 60252.05 63983.76 4144 14075 25174 70983 182526 
Total population 566274.26 604828.27 46511 103467 235033 675962 1752492 
White population 482845.6 487603.23 42738 99086 210612 565368 1415805 
African-American population 28292.9 42000.6 127 1520 6890 54569 117816 
Native American population 10492.85 10095.56 393 2262 7514 15320 33912 
Asian population 54333.8 81033.28 619 2388 12661 51494 244324 
Hispanic Population 31952.18 31015.81 1614 9811 18830 39542 101980 
Real average wage per job 19579.95 4155.34 14596.76 15878.2 18033.92 20836.78 27616.39 
        
Number of Observations 396       
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Table 3 three breaks down the descriptive statistics by profit status into for-
profit firms, private, nonprofit firms, and government firms.  Private nonprofit 
hospitals are the largest in terms of workload, both for outpatients and inpatients.  
This is to be expected, given that most of the largest firms are in this category.  For 
profit hospitals are larger on average than government hospitals, which tend to be in 
the smallest size category.  For-profit and private nonprofit have similar overall 
casemix indices (0.95 and 0.97) compared to government hospitals (0.78).  Private 
nonprofit and for-profit firms also have similar Medicare and Medicaid casemix 
indices, but government hospitals tend to treat less-sick patients in these categories as 
well as overall.  Government hospitals also get a larger portion of billed charges paid 
by government insurers than do the other two categories, with for-profit hospitals 
lagging especially in payment for billed charges by Medicaid.  Government firms 
have lower real price of capital ($4.49) than do private nonprofits ($6.04) or for-profit 
Large Firms (Table 2: Continued)      
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1stQuartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 69801.35 61119.68 4733 36415.5 53395 88278 274592 
Medicare patient days 7092.27 3719.33 2 4907 6083 8993.5 17330 
Medicaid patient days 3584.36 3029.77 313 1340 2789 4661.5 14173 
Other patient days 7635.72 4778.59 647 4379.5 7746 9409.5 24533 
Proportion of charges paid 
by Medicare 0.59 0.15 0.15 0.49 0.59 0.68 1 
Proportion of charges paid 
by Medicaid 0.56 0.18 0.04 0.45 0.53 0.68 1 
Real operating costs 81943371 52655157 11985145 44309438.9 64348649 116629665.8 247907374 
Real price for supplies 22794.87 9668.29 8476.79 15847.94 20305.67 27414.11 51513.29 
Real price of capital 6.88 2.51 1.87 5.07 6.32 8.17 15.82 
Real price of labor 22.38 2.45 16.87 20.73 22.05 23.55 29.23 
Overall casemix index 1.19 0.26 0.76 1 1.14 1.43 1.7 
Medicare casemix index 1.48 0.25 0.96 1.38 1.48 1.59 2.34 
Medicaid casemix index 0.91 0.27 0.51 0.76 0.82 1.05 1.59 
Ratio of Medicare casemix 
to total casemix 1.27 0.15 0.9 1.2 1.29 1.36 1.51 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix 
to total casemix 0.76 0.11 0.51 0.68 0.74 0.8 1 
Medicare Herfindahl-type 
index 0.74 0.17 0.39 0.61 0.74 0.86 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type 
index 0.7 0.15 0.5 0.58 0.67 0.79 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.76 0.14 0.39 0.69 0.76 0.84 1 
Minor population 246301.45 136182.27 52751 107077 194070 387132 388384 
Elderly population 113235.34 67859.89 23041 52036 72832 182073 182526 
Total population 1054857.1 651081.4 202264 418673 718521 1738916 1752492 
White population 874695.79 513721.6 184163 396382 607376 1411131 1415805 
African-American population 65461.22 46808.18 3447 9667 63601 115041 117816 
Native American population 19925.99 10333.79 3323 10381 19919 33855 33912 
Asian population 117536.4 99920.98 4050 12661 61909 237072 244324 
Hispanic Population 60660.96 33876.63 9032 34669 70888 96258 101980 
Real average wage per job 21833 5053.48 14596.76 17630.63 18531.94 27549.36 27616.39 
        
Number of Observations 233       
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firms ($7.63).  Labor costs are lower for government firms ($19.26) and for-profit 
firms ($19.82) than for private, nonprofit firms ($21.28).  Government firms serve 
patients in areas that are more white and smaller than do the other two types of 
hospitals.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - By Profit Status  
        
For-Profit Firms        
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1st  Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 27876.81 17708.01 12293 13980 19708.5 49404.5 62413 
Medicare patient days 2673.02 1600.36 312 1866.5 2602 4315.75 5499 
Medicaid patient days 701.98 407.89 169 309.75 618 1037.75 1729 
Other patient days 1430.4 741.66 26 668 1681 2004 2514 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicare 0.54 0.09 0.34 0.47 0.54 0.6 0.78 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicaid 0.44 0.16 0.05 0.38 0.45 0.55 0.91 
Real operating costs 20226968 9583277.3 4724531.6 17523000.4 20792593 25325892.5 38557891 
Real price for supplies 11477.08 3876.01 4836.21 9466.63 12028.17 14788.39 17165.74 
Real price of capital 7.63 3.43 2.93 4.35 7.68 10.64 14.12 
Real price of labor 19.82 1.61 17.39 18.66 19.59 20.13 24.65 
Overall casemix index 0.95 0.23 0.56 0.93 0.98 1.16 1.22 
Medicare casemix index 1.2 0.2 0.86 1.09 1.22 1.38 1.42 
Medicaid casemix index 0.76 0.15 0.48 0.72 0.84 0.86 0.92 
Ratio of Medicare casemix to 
total casemix 1.29 0.15 1.13 1.18 1.24 1.32 1.6 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix to 
total casemix 0.81 0.1 0.64 0.71 0.85 0.88 0.98 
Medicare Herfindahl-type index 0.64 0.18 0.41 0.51 0.56 0.67 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type index 0.93 0.12 0.59 0.89 1 1 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.91 0.13 0.47 0.85 1 1 1 
Minor population 151707.02 142227.85 52751 69388 70063 371288 388384 
Elderly population 67953.4 71029.77 23041 24679 24956 181627 182526 
Total population 626999.66 670124 202264 218808 222710 1654329 1752492 
White population 526504.5 536039.38 184163 198857 206232 1359991 1415805 
African-American population 32736.98 46886.93 3447 3462 3972 97734 117816 
Native American population 14868.43 8976.63 3323 12297 13020 19919 33912 
Asian population 62924.28 93246.69 4050 4153 7339 176685 244324 
Hispanic Population 64089.29 30911.19 9032 69654 72561 82332 101980 
Real average wage per job 18887.77 5198.47 14596.76 14703.89 16374.33 25860.63 27616.39 
        
Number of Observations 58       
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Private, Nonprofit Firms (Table 3: Continued)     
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1stQuartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 39309.17 49613.05 1329 12962.25 23425 45950 274592 
Medicare patient days 4678.12 3756.25 2 1309.75 4301 6217.5 17330 
Medicaid patient days 1942.91 1701.36 13 664.5 1321 2818.5 7775 
Other patient days 4337.12 4340.45 67 1279.5 2887 6704.75 24533 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicare 0.57 0.13 0.15 0.49 0.57 0.64 1 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicaid 0.51 0.15 0.02 0.41 0.5 0.58 1 
Real operating costs 45224497 47536924 1033624.5 15272101.4 28825315 56314264.48 247907374 
Real price for supplies 15445.09 8352.33 2280.47 9744.58 14218.68 19312.28 51513.29 
Real price of capital 6.04 2.29 1.87 4.58 5.3 7.15 15.82 
Real price of labor 21.28 2.53 14.66 20.26 21.3 22.46 29.23 
Overall casemix index 0.97 0.21 0.63 0.83 0.94 1.09 1.6 
Medicare casemix index 1.25 0.27 0.73 1.08 1.19 1.42 2.34 
Medicaid casemix index 0.71 0.22 0.36 0.55 0.64 0.82 1.56 
Ratio of Medicare casemix to 
total casemix 1.29 0.12 0.98 1.23 1.29 1.35 1.6 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix to 
total casemix 0.73 0.11 0.49 0.66 0.7 0.79 1.02 
Medicare Herfindahl-type index 0.76 0.22 0.35 0.6 0.78 1 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type index 0.8 0.18 0.41 0.62 0.85 1 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.77 0.19 0.34 0.63 0.78 1 1 
Minor population 152656 143585.44 5021 19145.25 106918 326983.5 388384 
Elderly population 69308.81 68646.64 3208 10714 50707 154428.25 182526 
Total population 640830.24 652564.78 20487 68990 409736 1420377 1752492 
White population 539323.85 524431.54 20076 67195 385450 1171837.25 1415805 
African-American population 36960.19 45665.99 57 1141 7494 89200.75 117816 
Native American population 12239.66 11148.51 327 2750 10112 20191 33912 
Asian population 65225.86 89875.85 118 1417 12661 147991 244324 
Hispanic Population 35467.65 35025.17 388 8704 15176 70888 101980 
Real average wage per job 19315.02 4694.79 13085.63 15556.33 17718.75 24645.78 27616.39 
        
Number of Observations 472       
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Government Firms (Table 3:  Continued)      
        
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1stQuartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Total outpatient visits 16385.84 23694.61 445 3669 7577 14416.75 113672 
Medicare patient days 1284.09 1810.7 46 295.75 483.5 1058.5 8050 
Medicaid patient days 1312.07 2333.96 3 121.75 355 1650.5 14173 
Other patient days 1571.8 2570.42 4 279 636 1441.75 15196 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicare 0.66 0.12 0.03 0.58 0.66 0.74 1 
Proportion of charges paid by 
Medicaid 0.6 0.19 0.01 0.48 0.6 0.74 1 
Real operating costs 14359856 27616639 395121.87 2145096.27 3762111.3 10832734.16 140792019 
Real price for supplies 10710.17 9194.63 133.47 3664.3 7843.42 14926.02 47258.3 
Real price of capital 4.49 2.38 0.08 2.86 3.95 5.57 14.94 
Real price of labor 19.26 3.2 9 17.31 19.39 21.34 28.03 
Overall casemix index 0.78 0.24 0.42 0.66 0.75 0.83 1.7 
Medicare casemix index 0.97 0.24 0.62 0.81 0.92 1.09 1.97 
Medicaid casemix index 0.6 0.23 0.33 0.47 0.54 0.63 1.59 
Ratio of Medicare casemix to 
total casemix 1.28 0.21 0.9 1.15 1.25 1.4 1.96 
Ratio of Medicaid casemix to 
total casemix 0.77 0.15 0.51 0.68 0.73 0.82 2.02 
Medicare Herfindahl-type index 0.77 0.21 0.34 0.58 0.77 1 1 
Medicaid Herfindahl-type index 0.89 0.16 0.5 0.83 1 1 1 
Other Herfindahl-type index 0.87 0.16 0.44 0.74 0.93 1 1 
Minor population 70768.42 120272.28 573 5648 16970 40941 388384 
Elderly population 31891.32 55899.13 492 3883.75 8760 14882 182526 
Total population 295069.8 533114.7 2317 20944 64690 137844 1752492 
White population 251026.71 435341.15 2293 19930 60062 131031 1415805 
African-American population 14378.3 34517.48 0 86 545 1783 117816 
Native American population 5620.94 9063.83 12 671 1502 4607.5 33912 
Asian population 29237.34 67898.3 11 290 982 4207 244324 
Hispanic Population 17871.01 26882.82 37 1496 5678 21598 101980 
Real average wage per job 16680.91 4375.19 12114.64 13921.31 15031.98 20055.83 27616.39 
Number of Observations 506       
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 The results from the cost function estimation are shown in Table 4.   Of 
primary interest are the effects of government reimbursement on the cost function.  
We first tested the joint restriction (as stated in the empirical methodology) that these 
variables have no overall effect on the industry cost function using a standard F-test.  
The calculated F-statistic takes a value of 7.51, which rejects the null hypothesis at a 
5% level of significance (The restricted model carries an R2 value of .997918 with 
144 estimated parameters (892 degrees of freedom). Thus, we can conclude with at 
least 95% certainty that the cost of the average provider in this sample responds to 
changes in government discounts to charges.   
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Table 4:  Cost Function Estimation 
 
Coefficient  Est. Value Std. Error T-Ratio
  
Panel A.  Cost Function   
  
Total outpatient visits 0.0541*** 0.0193 2.79
  
Medicare patient days 0.0893*** 0.0236 3.77
  
Other patient days 0.0318* 0.0167 1.90
  
Medicaid patient days 0.0509*** 0.0152 3.34
  
Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare -0.1143*** 0.0227 -5.04
  
Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid -0.0258** 0.0130 -1.98
  
Real price for supplies 0.2439*** 0.0252 9.67
  
Real price for capital 0.0321** 0.0158 2.03
  
Real price for labor 0.3230*** 0.0599 5.39
  
Panel B.  Output/Discount Cross Products   
  
Medicaid patient days * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare 0.0077 0.0179 0.43
  
Medicare patient days * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare -0.0133 0.0138 -0.95
  
Medicaid patient days * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid -0.0274*** 0.0083 -3.29
  
Medicare patient days * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid 0.0057 0.0114 0.49
  
Total outpatient visits * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid -0.0051 0.0122 -0.41
  
Total outpatient visits * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare -0.0274 0.0240 -1.14
  
Panel C.  Price/Discount Cross Products   
  
Real price of labor * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare 0.0869 0.1181 0.73
  
Real price of labor * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid 0.0624 0.0646 0.96
  
Real price of supplies * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare -0.0761*** 0.0287 -2.64
  
Real price of supplies * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid -0.0259 0.0202 -1.27
  
Real price of capital * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare 0.0383* 0.0224 1.70
  
Real price of capital * Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid -0.0075 0.0177 -0.42
  
Panel D.  Price/Output Cross Products   
  
Real price for supplies * Other patient days 0.0304** 0.0139 2.19
  
Real price of capital * Total outpatient visits -0.0023 0.0126 -0.17
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Table 2.  Cost Function (Continued) Est. Value Std. Error T-Ratio 
 
Real price of capital * Medicare patient days 0.0006 0.0168 0.03
  
Real price of capital * Medicaid patient days 0.0329*** 0.0121 2.72
  
Real price of capital * Other patient days -0.0392*** 0.0137 -2.84
  
Real price of labor * Total outpatient visits 0.0396 0.0589 0.67
  
Real price of labor * Medicare patient days 0.1492*** 0.0473 3.15
  
Real price of labor * Medicaid patient days -0.1202*** 0.0363 -3.31
  
Real price of labor * Other patient days 0.0604 0.0466 1.29
   
Real price of supplies * Total outpatient visits -0.0211 0.0176 -1.19
  
Real price of supplies * Medicare patient days -0.0303** 0.0141 -2.14
  
Real price of supplies * Medicaid patient days 0.0511*** 0.0111 4.58
  
Panel E.  Price Cross Products   
  
Real price of labor * Real price of supplies -0.0567 0.0698 -0.81
  
Real price of Labor * Real price of capital 0.2544*** 0.0743 3.42
  
Real price of supplies * Real price of capital -0.1049*** 0.0215 -4.87
  
Panel F.  Output Cross Products   
  
Total other patient days * Medicare patient days 0.0397* 0.0222 1.78
  
Total other patient days * Medicaid patient days 0.0381*** 0.0122 3.11
  
Total outpatient visits * Medicaid patient days -0.0242*** 0.0092 -2.63
  
Total outpatient visits * Total other days 0.0266*** 0.0095 2.79
  
Medicare patient days * Medicaid patient days -0.0289*** 0.0076 -3.79
  
Medicare patient days * Total other patient days -0.0501*** 0.0092 -5.40
  
Medicare patient days * Total outpatient visits 0.0000 0.0000 0.73
  
Medicaid patient days * Total other patient days -0.0445*** 0.0067 -6.68
  
Panel G.  Discount Cross product   
  
Prop. reimbursed by Medicare * Prop. reimbursed by Medicaid0.0731* 0.0375 1.95 
  
Panel H.  Control Variables   
  
Ratio of Medicare CMI to hospital-wide CMI 0.0497 0.0690 0.71
  
Ratio of Medicaid CMI to hospital-wide CMI -0.0386 0.0342 -1.13
  
Medicare Herfindahl type index  0.0391 0.0239 1.63
  
Medicaid Herfindahl type index  0.0299 0.0321 0.93
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Table 2.  Cost Function (Continued) Est. Value Std. Error T-Ratio 
 
Other patient days Herfindahl type index  -0.0703** 0.0284 -2.47
  
Average wage per job per county divided by annual cpi 0.3303** 0.1437 2.29
  
Number of minors 0.1412 0.1827 0.77
  
Number of elderly 0.2529*** 0.0950 2.66
  
White population -0.7780** 0.3642 -2.13
  
Black population -0.1424*** 0.0211 -6.73
  
Native American population 0.1119*** 0.0277 4.03
  
Asian population 0.1054*** 0.0256 4.12
  
Total Hispanic population -0.0331 0.0261 -1.26
  
Constant 0.9749 2.9110 0.33
  
Panel I.  Second Order Conditions   
  
Total outpatient visits squared 0.0192 0.0168 1.14
  
Medicare patient days squared 0.0318*** 0.0084 3.77
  
Other patient days squared 0.0593*** 0.0081 7.36
  
Medicaid patient days squared 0.0266*** 0.0094 2.84
  
Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicare squared -0.1470*** 0.0446 -3.29
  
Proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid squared -0.0251* 0.0139 -1.79
  
Real price for supplies squared 0.1243*** 0.0256 4.86
  
Real price for capital squared 0.1055*** 0.0276 3.82
  
Real price for labor squared -1.0017*** 0.2885 -3.47
  
Notes:  ***denotes significance at the 1 percent level, **5 percent level, and * 10 percent level.   
R-squared =  0.998224;      Adjusted R-squared = 0.99789;  
number of observations = 1036;     parameters estimated = 164.  
 
In this model, there are 16 time-specific estimates, 81 group-specific estimates, 
an overall intercept estimate and 66 slope coefficient estimates (165 total estimated 
parameters).  However, this specification also leads to perfect multicolinearity 
because the time-specific effects and the firm-specific effects each sum to one.  To 
avoid this problem, we impose the restriction that the sum of the group specific effects 
equals the sum of the time specific effects equals zero: = =0.  Thus, the 
number of estimated parameters is reduced by one, to 164. 
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 Having determined that government reimbursement, on aggregate, does have a 
significant, average impact on hospital costs, we can go further to examine how 
individual variables impact costs.  Of particular interest for policy reasons are the 
elasticities of cost with respect to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.  The results 
from Table 4, Panel A show that each has a significant, negative effect on total cost, 
and the magnitude of the effect is nearly 4 times greater for Medicare compared to 
Medicaid (-0.1143 and -0.0258, respectively).   These results give two important 
findings.  First, lower government reimbursement as a proportion of total charges 
actually leads to higher total hospital costs, holding all other specified regressors 
constant.  And while the magnitudes of these elasticities are quite small, they actually 
result in very large changes in costs, on total.  For example, a one percent reduction in 
Medicare reimbursement (as a percentage of total charges) increases total hospital 
costs by 11.43%.  However, since real costs, on average, are approximately $28.75 
million, this results in a total increase in expenses of almost $3.3 million.  This 
implies that not only is cost shifting occurring, but the magnitude of cost shifting is 
quite large. (Friesner and Rosenman (2003, 2004) found evidence of cost adjusting 
and cost shifting in Washington state hospitals, although their panels covered a 
different time period than the one used in this study.)  Second, hospital costs are much 
more responsive to changes in Medicare reimbursement than Medicaid 
reimbursement.  The latter implies that the magnitude of cost shifting is much more 
pronounced for Medicare than for Medicaid patients.  Given the fact that hospitals are 
more reliant on Medicare patients and are reimbursed a smaller proportion of billed 
charges, this finding is not surprising.   
 
 From a policy perspective, this finding has far reaching implications.  
Government policy makers, often concerned about the direct costs of the programs 
they administer, ratchet down (prospective) reimbursement rates.  Hospitals, 
concerned about revenue, raise overall charges, so the government proportion of 
billed charges might fall.  But total costs go up, so from a global perspective, rather 
than from the perspective of the individual government program, the policy is 
ineffective.  More insightful government policymaking should be concerned with the 
external effects of decisions made within their programs, and our findings indicate 
some other policy avenues could be more effective.  But clearly, just lowering the 
proportion of billed charges reimbursed by government insurance does not lead to 
lower overall hospital costs. The elasticities of cost with respect to the patient day 
variables are all statistically significant, but quite modest.  These elasticities range 
from 0.0318 for other patient days to 0.0893 for Medicare.  Again, however, these 
elasticities translate to large real total operating cost effects for the average firm, 
ranging from $914,256 for other patient days to $2,567,392 for Medicare.  The 
elasticity of cost with respect to outpatient visits is also statistically significant, with 
an elasticity of 0.0541.  With the exception of capital, the elasticities of cost with 
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respect to the input prices are much greater:  supplies 0.2439 ($7,012,173); capital 
0.0321 ($922,881); and labor 0.3230 ($9,286,314).  
 
Since the joint restriction indicated that overall government reimbursement 
affected cost, we looked further.  Government reimbursement may have an indirect 
effect on costs through its impact on the way providers respond to changes in either 
their relative patient mix or relative input prices.   Table 4, Panel B details the cross 
effects of output variables with respect to the proportion of charges reimbursed by the 
government.  There are two, mathematically symmetric ways to look at these cross 
effects.  The first is to suppose that costs respond to government reimbursement and 
use the estimates to see how changes in other variables, for example, the number of 
Medicare patient days, affects that responsiveness.   But since we are looking for 
indirect effects, we choose to interpret the estimates from the alternative perspective -- 
how changes in the government reimbursement affect the response of cost to patient 
days.   
 
With this interpretation, the cost elasticity with respect to Medicaid days is 
smaller when the portion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid is larger.  Increases in 
Medicaid reimbursements induce hospitals to be less cost responsive to changes in 
Medicaid patient days. However, the magnitude of this effect is quite small (-0.0274), 
indicating that providers are not very responsive in this way.  In contrast, the 
corresponding elasticities for Medicare were statistically insignificant, as well as the 
effect of both forms of government reimbursement on total patient visits.   
 
It is interesting to pause and consider why Medicaid reimbursement has a 
significant effect on Medicaid patient days, while Medicare did not.  From Table 1 we 
see that total Medicare patient days are, on average, almost twice as large as total 
Medicaid days, while the proportion of charges reimbursed by Medicaid is less than 
that of Medicare.  Thus, we suggest two effects.  The larger number of Medicare 
patients makes it more difficult for hospitals to adjust costs, regardless of the 
magnitude of the Medicare reimbursements, and since Medicare reimbursements are 
higher, there is less incentive to do so. 
 
Table 4, panel C, presents the cross elasticities of cost with respect to the 
government reimbursement variables and the input prices.  The cross elasticity with 
respect to the Medicare reimbursement is significant for real price of capital.  
Although this effect is again small (0.0383), it does indicate that responsiveness of 
cost to the price of capital increases with Medicare reimbursement.  In addition, 
hospitals are less responsive to higher real prices for supplies as Medicare 
reimbursements increase, as evidenced by a cross elasticity of -0.0761.  The cross 
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elasticities of cost with respect to Medicaid reimbursement and the input prices were 
not significantly different than zero (at a 95% level of confidence or better).   
 
Table 4, panel I, presents the second order conditions for the primary variables.  
Of particular interest in this set of estimates is how the influences of charge 
reimbursement by Medicare and Medicaid changes on the margin.  Both of these 
parameter estimates are negative and statistically significant (although Medicaid is 
only significant at the 10 percent level).  Thus, although lowering the reimbursement 
rate increases costs, it does so at a decreasing rate, indicating that the ability to cost 
shift diminishes as the reimbursement rate falls. 
 
Table 4, panel H summarizes the effects of our demographic control variables 
on cost.  Larger elderly, Asian and Native American populations (on a percentage 
basis) increase hospital costs, while larger white populations reduce hospital costs.   
Higher income levels within the county and year also lead to higher costs, presumably 
because higher income communities are less reliant on Medicare and Medicaid 
insurance.  A one-percent increase in the number of minors has no significant impact 
on hospital costs, while, somewhat surprisingly, a one percent increase in the black 
population causes significantly lower hospital costs. 
 
Important other estimates in Table 4, Panel H provide evidence about how the 
mix of services and patient illness severity impacts costs.  The illness severity of 
Medicare and Medicare patients (relative to all patients) did not significantly impact 
costs.  Additionally, the distribution of beds across the four types of inpatient services 
was insignificant for all but the non-government insured group.  This indicates that the 
distribution of services provided to Medicare and Medicaid patients has no impact on 
costs after controlling for the other regressors in the cost function.  However, a more 
skewed distribution of services actually reduces costs for non-government patients.  
 
A final issue of interest is the significance of the group specific and time 
specific effects. As stated in the empirical methodology, if these effects are not 
correlated with the regressors, then the random effect model provides efficient 
estimates and should be utilized.  However, if there is correlation between the 
individual effects and the regressors, then the random effect model provides 
inconsistent estimates, and the fixed effect (LSDV) model should be used.  This is an 
important issue in our study, because if quality and time-based market fluctuations 
(which are unobserved and included in the fixed effects) are important determinants of 
a provider’s cost, then they should be correlated with input prices, outputs and 
(possibly) the government reimbursement variables.  We used the Hausman test to 
check.  The calculated test statistic takes a value of 293.10, which easily rejects the 
null hypothesis of no correlation at better than a 5% level of significance.  
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Consequently, these results support (but do not prove) our assertion that quality and 
time do matter in a provider’s total cost structure.  Additionally, this result raises the 
possibility that regression to the mean in costs may still be a substantial problem in 
Washington state hospitals.  We also tested whether the time-specific effects were 
statistically significant determinants of a firm’s total costs. Employing an F-test 
(under the null hypothesis of no time-specific effects) we obtained an F15,873-statistic 
of 7.55, which easily rejects the null hypothesis at a 5% level of significance.  Thus, if 
there is correlation between the regressors and the error terms (as shown by the 
Hausman test), the results of the F-test provide supporting evidence that the time-
specific effects are contributing to this result, possibly because of regression to the 
mean in costs.  In any case, our decision to use the LSDV estimator was a correct one.   
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 An estimated cost function for hospitals in Washington state allowed us to 
examine the individual effects of government reimbursement on the behavior of the 
hospitals.  We found that, overall, changes in Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement 
have a statistically significant impact on costs in Washington state hospitals. Using 
cross-effects of cost with respect to outputs and input prices separately with 
government reimbursements, we were able to develop some understanding of the 
nature of the relationship between changing reimbursements and costs.  Increasing the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate makes hospitals less cost responsive to Medicaid 
inpatient days.  We would expect, given these findings, that changes in government 
reimbursement, especially by Medicaid, may induce hospitals to try to change their 
patient mix. 
 
We also found that changes in Medicare reimbursement made costs less 
responsive to the prices of supplies, but more responsive to the price of capital. This 
indicates that hospitals may respond to changes in Medicare reimbursement by 
altering their relative input mix, particularly their capital and purchased materials.  
The ability to do so in response to changes in Medicare reimbursements but not to 
changes in Medicaid reimbursements may be attributable to the greater share of 
hospital business that is paid by Medicare.     
  
In addition, we found the magnitudes of our elasticities to be quite small; 
however, given the large total costs of a hospital, our findings are economically 
significant.  For example, the effect of a change in the proportion of charges 
reimbursed by Medicaid on Medicaid patient days is -0.0761.  This translates to a 
reduction in total real operating costs for the average hospital of $2,187,890.       
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Our findings have some important policy implications.  The empirical analysis 
implies that decreases in government reimbursement increase total hospital costs, 
indicating the likelihood of cost shifting.  Thus, as a policy tool, government enforced 
discounts to charges should be used with caution.  Government policy makers 
concerned may impose a detrimental incentive on health care costs in general.  From a 
societal perspective the policy is undesirable.  Because of the changes in patient mix 
that also accompanies changes in government reimbursement, the overall effect is 
uncertain, and it may be that total costs fall if government insurance pays a greater 
share of the billed charges because less cost shifting is more efficient, and the patient 
mix also allows hospitals to increase efficiency, lowering total costs. 
  
A bigger question arises as managed care and other institutional structures in 
the private insurance market push for similar discounts to charges.  If we extrapolate 
from what was found for Medicare discounts, which has approximately the same 
share as private payers, this is a failed policy for controlling overall hospital costs, 
although the managed care providers may achieve cost savings.  But our findings 
indicate the gain comes from cost shifting.  As a greater share of charges are 
prospective, the ability to cost shift falls.  As a result, hospitals will simply become 
less financially viable, putting at risk the current healthcare system. 
 
 While our analysis provides some useful implications for public policy, it is 
intended as a first step, and our results should be viewed with caution.  Our study is 
exploratory in nature and should be considered only as a partial correlation analysis.  
Thus, it is important that future research develop (and test) a theory governing the 
causal relationship between government reimbursement and a provider’s cost 
structure.  Another drawback of our analysis is that we utilize hospital-wide data.  As 
a result, our study may suffer from the aggregation bias described in Dranove (1988).  
Repeating this same analysis at the level of the cost center would provide an 
invaluable contribution to the literature.        
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